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Abstract
The paper describes an ongoing effort in developing a declarative system for supporting operators in the
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) control room. The focus is on two modules: diagnosis and explanation of events
that happened in NPPs. We describe an Answer Set Programming (ASP) representation of an NPP, which
consists of declarations of state variables, components, their connections, and rules encoding the plant
behavior. We then show how the ASP program can be used to explain the series of events that occurred in
the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2) NPP accident, the most severe accident in the USA nuclear power
plant operating history. We also describe an explanation module aimed at addressing answers to questions
such as “why an event occurs?” or “what should be done?” given the collected data.
This paper is *under consideration* for acceptance in TPLP Journal.
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1 Introduction
When an incident occurs in the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), the operator is expected to diagnose
faults and make decisions promptly to keep the plant operational and safe. A misdiagnosis or a
late decision by the operator may cause catastrophic accidents. Although operators go through
years of training before working in an NPP control room, 80% of the NPP incidents are attributed
to human error (DOE 2009).
The occurrence of human error is due to the complexity of the system that produces many
alarms after a malfunction in addition to the psychological pressure that the operator goes through.
Besides, it is overwhelming to monitor hundreds of indicators in the control room and interact
with dynamic events. If proper control actions are not executed on time, nuclear reactor trip set
points are reached, and a reactor shutdown cannot be avoided. NPPs can lose over $1,000,000 in
revenue for every day they are shut down (Lew et al. 2018).
Since human error may impact NPP safety and economic viability, it is a prominent goal of the
nuclear industry to minimize the chances of human error. Therefore, there has been an increased
interest in the implementation of AI methods that integrate information across the control room
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to assist the operator in diagnosing the faults and making corrective actions. Additionally, these
AI methods may minimize the needed staffing size and enable deploying reactors at remote sites.
Recently, there have been numerous efforts toward implementing AI methods that are capable
of diagnosis, identifying viable actions, and recommending decisions to the operator. AI statis-
tical methods (such as deep learning and Bayesian network) that support the operator decisions
have been proposed (Darling et al. 2018; Boroushaki et al. 2003; Peng et al. 2018). Statistical
methods assume that big data from the NPP history or simulations are available to predict un-
known variables (e.g., pipe break size or a component failure probability). The success of these
methods relies on the sufficiency and relevance of the available data. At the same time, the re-
liance on simulated data, the sensitivity with changes in data, and the ”black-box” style of these
methods provide a real challenge for their deployment.
Because of the issues of statistical approaches, an alternative has been developed to support op-
erators of the NPP. In this approach, the NPP system is described as a knowledge base, i.e., a set
of facts, logic rules, and constraints. Examples of these rules may include flow paths, operation
constraints, and emergency procedures. Automated reasoning is then used with the knowledge
base to identify plans or diagnoses which support the operators’ decision-making process. Some
of the proposed reasoning methods to support the NPP operators are implemented using Java-
based rules engines such as the online fault detection system (Reifman and Wei 1999; Park and
Vilim 2017) and the multilevel model for reasoning about causes and consequences of malfunc-
tions (Lind and Zhang 2014). Other diagnosis methods (Chang et al. 1995) are based on the logic
programming language, Prolog (Clocksin and Mellish 2012).
In (Hanna et al. 2019), we proposed an Answer Set Programming (ASP) based system for
supporting the NPP management and demonstrated the capability of the system by computing a
plan for the operator to deal with situations such as a turbine control valve that drifts stuck closed
when it is supposed to be open.
Compared to other knowledge representation and reasoning methods (Reifman and Wei 1999;
Park and Vilim 2017; Lind and Zhang 2014; Chang et al. 1995) that have been proposed to
support the operators’ decision-making process, ASP has some attractive features. ASP is fully
declarative and more flexible compared to Prolog, e.g., it can deal with a program containing
negative cycles while Prolog will need to use a special technique for it. Additionally, the ASP-
based reasoning system proved to have better performance and availability compared to the Java-
based rules engines (Liang et al. 2009). Besides, none of the previous reasoning-based NPP
operator support systems were applied to or tested against a realistic complex scenario such as
the TMI-2 accident.
This paper is a continuation of earlier work (Hanna et al. 2019). The objectives of this paper
are:
1. Testing the capability of an ASP-based reasoning system by applying it to a real-world
situation with significant consequences.
2. Demonstrating that the ASP-based reasoning system answers (diagnoses and recommen-
dations) can be accompanied by rational explanations.
To achieve the above goals, we experiment with the ASP-based NPP operator support system
with the available data about the most severe nuclear accident in US history, the Three Mile
Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident (NRC 1979; NSAC 1980). We experiment with this accident
for different reasons. First, a large amount of data about system behavior prior to the accident
is available. Second, this data has been analyzed extensively by nuclear engineering researchers,
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Fig. 1: A diagram of the TMI-2 NPP (U.S.NRC 2018)
which identify precisely the reasons of the accident as well as possible recommendations that
could help to avoid the accident. Third, the data has not been looked at from the perspective of
a declarative reasoner, such as the NPP operator support system. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work to apply an automated reasoning system to the TMI-2 accident scenario.
2 Background
2.1 The Nuclear Power Plant System
A simplified view of the TMI-2 reactor system is depicted in Figure 1. The reactor design de-
picted in Figure 1 is called ‘pressurized water reactor’ which constitute most of the world plants
today.
In the reactor core, a self-sustained nuclear fission reaction is controlled using the control rods
that absorb neutrons available for fission. If the control rods are inserted deeper into the reactor,
the heat created by the reactor and the reactor power output decrease and vice versa. The reactor
coolant is pressurized (kept under high pressure) water, so it does not boil. Pressurized water is
pumped, through the primary loop, by the primary pump, through the reactor and absorbs heat
from the nuclear fuel.
The reactor coolant goes through the steam generator, where heat is transferred to lower-
pressure water in the secondary loop (note that primary and secondary loops’ coolants do not
mix). Secondary loop low-pressure water is allowed to boil to produce steam for the turbine,
causing it to turn the generator that produces electricity. The unused steam is exhausted to the
condenser to get condensed into water that is pumped back, by the condensate pump and the
feedwater pump, to the steam generator. Auxiliary (emergency) feedwater pumps are available to
supply water to the steam generator to remove heat from the reactor when the reactor is shutdown.
One of the major components in the primary loop is the pressurizer, whose function is main-
taining the primary coolant pressure by a heater and water sprayer to increase/decrease the
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coolant pressure. If needed, valves are used to release any excess pressure. Some of these valves
are shown in Figure 1: the Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) and the block valve.
For simplicity, Figure 1 shows only one primary loop and one secondary loop. However, the
TMI-2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) consists of 2 flow loops (loops A and B), each with a
steam generator, a reactor, and pumps. Both flow loops (A and B) share the same pressurizer.
Before the accident, a leakage, accumulated in the reactor coolant drain tank, was identified to
be from the PORV and was calculated to be within technical limits. Additionally, the secondary
loop auxiliary feedwater line block valves, that are normally open, were inadvertently left closed
(NRC 1979). An overview of the TMI-2 accident is presented in the next section.
2.2 A Summary of the Three Mile Island Accident
The TMI-2 partial reactor meltdown on March 28th, 1979, is the most severe accident in the
NPP history in the US. The TMI-2 accident occurred because of equipment failures, human
errors, design-related problems, and lack of training. However, we present a simplified summary
of the first 142 minutes of the accident based on a view that focuses on human errors and human
reasoning. The accident can be summarized as follows (NRC 1979; NSAC 1980):
The accident started when the plant experienced a loss of main feedwater and the resulting
automatic shutdown of the turbine. The auxiliary feedwater pumps started automatically, as de-
signed, to make up for the loss of feedwater flow. Within the first minute of the event, the steam
generator water level dropped to the point where automatic controls called for the auxiliary
feedwater, to maintain a minimum steam generator water level. However, closed block valves
between the control valves and the steam generators initially prevented the auxiliary feedwa-
ter from being delivered to the steam generators. These valves were opened by the operators 8
minutes after the accident was initiated.
Immediately after the loss of main feedwater, the RCS pressure began to increase. When the
RCS pressure increased to 2255 PSI, the pressurizer PORV opened to relieve the excess pressure,
but RCS pressure continued to increase, and the reactor was tripped automatically. With the
reactor trip, the RCS pressure decreased, but the pressurizer PORV failed to close when the
closure setpoint was reached, and the coolant continued to escape through the PORV whose
failure to close was not recognized by the staff for some time. As the escape of water continued,
the water level in the system fell. The pressure in the pressurizer also fell, falling so low that the
generation of steam started in the reactor core, a condition for which this type of reactor is not
designed (operators did not know about the formation of steam in the RCS).
Because the RCS pressure continued to decrease, an emergency cooling system, the High-
Pressure Injection System (HPIS), started automatically at about 2 minutes. Therefore, the pres-
surizer water level was rising until the water level was off the scale, which indicated that the
pressurizer (and the whole RCS) is expected to be filled with water or “going solid.” The opera-
tors were trained not to let the pressurizer get solid. Therefore, the operators decided to throttle
the HPIS pumps, but the pressurizer water level kept rising.
As reactor coolant inventory decreased because of the stuck open pressurizer PORV, the pri-
mary pumps output flow rate decreased until the primary pumps were finally stopped. After more
than 2 hours of the beginning of the accident, the PORV block valve was closed. Because the pri-
mary loop temperature continued to rise, the operators decided to turn on the HPIS pumps to get
the reactor refilled with water. Finally, the RCS was filled with water, but the reactor core was
partially melted. The sequence of events is presented in Table 1.
In this complex scenario, it was challenging for the operators to make timely decisions due to:
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Table 1: The TMI-2 accident key sequence of events
Clock time (AM) Time(seconds) Event
04:00:36 0 Normal operation
04:00:37 1 Condensate pumps trip
04:00:38 2 Feedwater pumps trip
04:00:38 2 Turbine trips
04:00:38 2 Auxiliary feedwater pumps start
04:00:43 7 Pressuirzer PORV opens due to high primary loop pressure
04:00:47 11 Reactor trips
04:00:47 11 Primary loop pressure starts decreasing, but the PORV remains open.
04:02:38 122 HPIS system starts
04:05:15 279 Operators throttle HPIS pumps
04:08:55 499 The auxiliary feedwater line block valve is opened (loop A)
04:08:56 500 The auxiliary feedwater line block valve is opened (loop B)
05:13:58 4402 Primary pump is tripped (loop A)
05:41:12 6036 Primary pump is tripped (loop B)
06:22:37 8521 Pressurizer block valve is closed
● A large number of time-dependent variables: For instance, many alarms occurred, and the op-
erator did not notice the containment sump high water level alarm (which suggested leakage
from the RCS). Also, the operators were concerned about an apparently rising primary water
level, and did not notice that the primary loop water reached saturation pressure (water con-
verted to steam) (Derivan, Michael 2014), The pressurizer water level was high because of a
growing steam region in the core.● The misleading reading: One of the complications of the TMI-2 scenario is the fact that the
pressurizer PORV was stuck open. The operators believed that it was closed because of the
control room indication, but the PORV status light was just an indication that the PORV
solenoid de-energized, giving a non-open indication to the control room operator. The PORV
should have reseated, but did not.
2.3 Answer Set Programming
Answer set programming (ASP) (Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1999; Niemela¨ 1999) is a declarative
programming paradigm based on logic programming under the answer set semantics. A logic
program Π is a set of rules of the form c← a1, . . . ,am, not b1, . . . , not bn where c, ai’s, and
bi’s are atoms of a propositional language1 and not represents (default) negation. Intuitively, a
rule states that if ai’s are believed to be true and none of the bi’s is believed to be true then c
must be true. For a rule r, r+ and r− denote the sets {a1, . . . ,am} and {b1, . . . ,bn}, respectively.
We write head(r) to denote c and refers to the right side of the rule as the body of r.
Let Π be a program. An interpretation I of Π is a set of ground atoms occurring in Π. The
body of a rule r is satisfied by I if r+ ⊆ I and r−∩ I =∅. A rule r is satisfied by I if the body of r
is satisfied by I implies I ⊧ c. When c is absent, r is a constraint and is satisfied by I if its body is
not satisfied by I. I is a model of Π if it satisfies all rules in Π.
1 For simplicity, we often use first order logic atoms in the text which represent all of its ground instantiations.
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For an interpretation I and a programΠ, the reduct ofΠw.r.t. I (denoted byΠI) is the program
obtained from Π by deleting (i) each rule r such that r− ∩ I ≠ ∅, and (ii) all atoms of the form
not a in the bodies of the remaining rules. Given an interpretation I, observe that the program
ΠI is a program with no occurrence of not a. An interpretation I is an answer set (Gelfond and
Lifschitz 1990) of Π if I is the least model (wrt. ⊆) of PI .
We rely on the notion of an off-line justification, introduced in (Pontelli et al. 2009), as an
explanation of an atom a given an answer set A of a program P. NANT(P) = {a∣a ∈ r− ∧ r ∈ P}
is the set of all negation atoms in P. Let C(P) denote the set of cautious consequences of P,
i.e., C(P) = C+ ∪C− where C+ is the set of atoms belonging to all answer sets of P and C−
is the set of atoms which do not belong to any answer set of P. A set of atoms U such that
U ⊆ NANT(P)∖ (A∪C(P)) is called a set of assumptions with respect to A if A =C(P∖ {r ∈
P ∣ head(r) ∈U}). Intuitively, given an answer set A of a program P, an atom a ∈ A (a /∈ A) is
considered to be true (false) given A. An off-line justification for an atom a presents a possible
reason for the truth value of a, i.e., it answers the question “why a ∈ A (or /∈ A)?”. If a is true in
A, an off-line justification of a represents a derivation of a from the set of assumptions U and
the set of facts in P. If a is false in A, an off-line justification encodes the reason why it is not
supported by A, which can be that it is assumed to be false (being an assumption in U) or there
exists no possible derivation of it given A. An off-line justification of a is analogous to the well-
known SLDNF tree in that it represents the derivation for a. The key difference between these
two notions is that an off-line justification might contain a cycle consisting of negative atoms, i.e.,
atoms not belonging to A. For this reason, a justification is represented as an explanation graph,
defined as follows. Given a program P, an answer set A, and a set of assumptions U with respect
to A. Let N = {x ∣ x ∈ A}∪{∼ x ∣ x /∈ A}∪{⊺,,assume} where ⊺ and  represent true and false,
respectively. An explanation graph of an atom a occurring in P is a finite labeled and directed
graph DGa = (Na,Ea) with Na ⊆ N and Ea ⊆ Na ×Na ×{+,−,○}, where (x,y,z) ∈ Ea represents a
link from x to y with the label z, and satisfies the following conditions:● if a ∈ A then a ∈Na and every node in Na must be reachable from a;● if a /∈ A then ∼ a ∈Na and every node in Na must be reachable from ∼ a;● if {(x,⊺,+)} ∈ Ea then x is a fact in P;● if {(∼ x,assume,○) ∈ Ea} then x ∈U ;● if {(∼ x,,+) ∈ Ea} then there exists no rule in P whose head is x;● there exists no x,y such that (⊺,x,y) ∈ Ea, (,x,y) ∈ Ea, or (assume,x,y) ∈ Ea;● for every x ∈Na∩A and x is not a fact in P,● there exists no y ∈Na∩A such that (x,y,−) or (x,y,○) belongs to Ea;● there exists no ∼ y ∈Na∩{∼ u ∣ u /∈ A} such that (x,∼ y,+) or (x,∼ y,○) belongs to Ea;● if X+ = {a′ ∣ (x,a′,+) ∈ Ea} and X− = {a′ ∣ (x,∼ a′,−) ∈ Ea} then X+ ⊆ A and X−∩A =∅ and
there is a rule r whose head is x in P such that r+ = X+ and r− = X−; and● DGa contains no cycle containing x.● for every ∼ x ∈Na∩{∼ u ∣ u /∈ A} and x /∈U ,● there exists no y ∈Na∩A such that (∼ x,y,+) or (∼ x,y,○) belongs to Ea;● there exists no ∼ y ∈Na∩{∼ u ∣ u /∈ A} such that (∼ x,∼ y,−) or (∼ x,∼ y,○) belongs to Ea;● if X+ = {a′ ∣ (∼ x,a′,−) ∈ Ea} and X− = {a′ ∣ (∼ x,∼ a′,+) ∈ Ea} then X+ ⊆ A and X−∩A =∅
and for every rule r whose head is x in P such that r+∩X− ≠∅ or r−∩X+ ≠∅; and● any cycle containing ∼ x in DGa contains only node in Na∩{∼ u ∣ u /∈ A}.
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Fig. 2: ASP-based operator support system
Given an explanation graph E and a node x in E, if x is an atom a then the nodes directly
connected to a—the nodes y such that (x,y, ) is an edge in E—represent a rule whose head is
a and whose body is satisfied by A; if x is ∼ a for some atom a, then the set of nodes directly
connected to a represents a set of atoms who truth values in A renders that any rule, whose head
is a, is unsatisfied by A. In other words, the direct connections with a node represents the support
for the node being in (or not in) the answer set. We refer the readers to (Pontelli et al. 2009)
for an in-depth discussion of properties of off-line justifications and the proof of existence of
such justifications for every atom in the program. Given a program P , an answer set A of P, and
an atom a occurring in P, explanation graphs for a can be generated by (i) determining the set
of assumptions U with respect to A; (ii) generating explanation graphs for a using P, A, and U
following its definition.
3 An ASP-Based Operator Support System for the NPP
The overall architecture of the proposed ASP-based operator support system (ASP4OSS) is de-
picted in Figure 2. It consists of four modules, the temporal projection, planning, diagnosis, and
explanation module. The first two modules have been described in detail in (Hanna et al. 2019).
In this paper, we focus on the diagnosis and explanation modules. The diagnosis module is built
on the work in using ASP for diagnosis (e.g., (Balduccini and Gelfond 2003)) with considerations
related to the NPP. We use data from the NPP TMI-2 and create inputs (signals) to ASP4OSS,
simulating the inputs from the NPP to the system. These signals carry information about the NPP
time-dependent variables and the actions that the operator executed or attempted at any time. For
the TMI-2 scenario, the list of relevant time-dependent variables is presented in Table 2. The first
seven variables in Table 2 are plotted in Figure 3. Due to the lack of data, the remaining nine
variables are assigned binary values (for instance, a turbine is on or off ). These 16 variables,
were selected, among many measured variables (Rempe and Knudson 2014) in the NPP, because
of their relevance to the TMI-2 scenario and because of the lack of data about other variables.
In this work, the NPP system formal description and the rules are inferred from (NRC 1979;
NSAC 1980).The program encoding the NPP is organized in different sets of rules, which are
listed below.
1. Facts: this set of rules consists of facts declaring the components, variables, the component
classification, the ranges of variables, and a steam table to compute the saturation pressure.
(a) Components: 22 components are listed such as2:
component(reactor1; primary_pump_a).
This declares the two components, reactor1 and primary pump a.
2 We use clingo’s syntax. See, e.g., https://potassco.org/clingo/.
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Table 2: The TMI-2 scenario relevant variables
# Variable # Variable
1 Reactor coolant system pressure 9 Condensate pump flow rate (loop B)
2 Steam generator water level (loop A) 10 Feedwater pump flow rate (loop A)
3 Steam generator water level (loop B) 11 Feedwater pump flow rate (loop B)
4 Primary pumps’ flow rates (loop A) 12 Emergency feedwater pump flow rate (loop A)
5 Primary pumps’ flow rates (loop B) 13 Emergency feedwater pump flow rate (loop B)
6 RCS inlet temperature (loop A) 14 HPIS pump flow rate
7 RCS inlet temperature (loop B) 15 Reactor power
8 Condensate pump flow rate (loop A) 16 Turbine power
(b) Component classification: Components are divided into groups. Each group have
common characteristics, e.g., all valves can be opened or closed and all pumps are
characterized by the flow rate. Also, the components that belong to the same loop
have the same coolant. For example, the next two rules specify two valves and
components belonging to the group primary loop A component:
valve(pressurizer_power_operated_relief_valve;
pressurizer_backup_block_valve).
primary_loop_A_component(reactor1; primary_pump_a;
steam_generator_primary_a; pressurizer;
pressurizer_power_operated_relief_valve;
pressurizer_backup_block_valve).
(c) Ranges of the variables: e.g., the percentage can have value 0, 1, . . ., 100 and the
upper bound of pressure in the primary loop is set to 2255 PSI:
percentage(0..100).
upper_pressure_boundary_primary_loop(2255). % PSI
(d) The steam table: The saturation pressure corresponding to each temperature is en-
coded by atoms of the form saturation/2. If the actual coolant pressure is lower than
the coolant saturation pressure, the coolant converts to steam and the reactor coola-
bility is impacted. For instance, if the water temperature is 521F, the water saturation
pressure is 820 PSI, as follows:
saturation(521,820).
2. Time-dependent rules: rules in this group account for variables and actions at previous
time steps, include
(a) Reasoning about possible actions: The operator can intervene by executing actions
such as increase/decrease the reactor power and increase/decrease the flow rate of
any pump. For each action, an executability condition is defined. An action cannot
be recommended unless its execution criteria are satisfied. For instance, the action
increase control rod power to(Y) will set the rod power to Y where Y is an in-
teger between 0 and 100, i.e., rods(C,Y) will be true. This action can be executed
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Fig. 3: TMI-2 time-dependent variables (Rempe and Knudson 2014).
at anytime. Seven rules3 for actions’ execution criteria are implemented. For ex-
ample, the action of opening an auxiliary feedwater block valve, aux f w valve, is
recommended if this valve is closed (as this valve should be normally opened) and
the action of opening that block valve is not already attempted. This rule is imple-
mented as:
recommendation(open,V,T):- aux_fw_valve(V), anytime(T),
closed(V,T), not attempted(open,V,T1), anytime(T1),
T<=(T1+M), action_execution_time_range(M).
The status of the valve (open/closed) can be found on the control room panels, and
it also can be inferred from other observed variables.
(b) Reasoning about non-observed variables: Non-observed variables cannot be mea-
sured but can be inferred based on the observed variables. Nine rules for inferring
non-observed variables are implemented. An example of a non-observed variable is
the formation of steam in any loop if the loop pressure is lower than the saturation
pressure corresponding to the loop temperature as follows:
steam(primary_loop_A,T):-
anytime(T),inlet_temperature_a(X,T),
primary_loop_pressure(P,T),
saturation(X,P1), P<P1.
(c) Reasoning about triggered actions: In the NPP, some actions are triggered automati-
cally if certain conditions are met, either by design or by failure of components, and
thus might not be executed by the operator. The occurrences of these actions can be
inferred by their effects, which can be detected by evaluating the observed variables.
3 To be precise, each rule is about a class of actions. We also omit several “scenario unrelated actions” for brevitty.
10 B. N. Hanna, L. T. Trieu, T. C. Son, and N. T. Dinh
Four rules for inferring actions are implemented. For example, the system can infer
that a pump is tripped if its flow rate changes from any value above zero to zero.
it_happened(trip,P,T):- pump(P),
time(T), pump_flow(P,F,T-1), pump_flow(P,0,T), F>0.
Surprisingly, the program is not very complex. It contains only a few rules with negation as
failure atoms (e.g., not attempted/3). In total, the module consists of almost 146000 facts and
20 non-ground rules. The main reason lies in that the history is complete, and our focus is only
on analyzing the accident.
To fully realize the potential of the system in live operation, rules developed for temporal pro-
jection and planning modules will be necessary to answer the question of “what-if procedure
X is executed at time step S?” or “how can problem Y be addressed?.” They have been devel-
oped in (Hanna et al. 2019) based on the action language and reasoning about actions and their
effects. The present work shows that the modeling of other aspects in the NPP domain (e.g., com-
ponents, actions, actions’ executability conditions, observed and non-observed variables, static
causal laws) could also be benefited from the use of ASP. We note that we could have also added
other elements of the action domain described in (Hanna et al. 2019), but they are unnecessary
in this setting. This is because values of time-dependent variables (fluents) are already available
as real data, and thus rules for action effects on variables would be obsolete for this situation.
In addition, because of most fluents in this domain are multi-valued fluents (e.g., a value in the
range from 0 to 100), direct encoding of the information related to the NPP in ASP rules is more
advantageous than a specification in an action language and then translated into ASP.
4 Explaining the TMI-2 Accident
4.1 Diagnosis Module
We collect data from (Rempe and Knudson 2014; NRC 1979) which records the sensor values
and the actions that have been executed by the operators during the TMI-2 accident. This data
is processed by the data processing module and encoded as facts of the form (i) variable(value,
time) where variable is one of the 16 variables listed in Table 2 and time is in the range [0,8521]
(corresponding to 8521 seconds); and (ii) attempted(procedure, component, time), which states
that the procedure is applied on component at the time (by the operators), and is referred as an
attempted action. The list of attempted actions is:
attempted(open,pressurizer_pilot_operated_relief_valve,7).
attempted(close,pressurizer_pilot_operated_relief_valve,11).
attempted(turn_off,high_pressure_injection_pump,279).
attempted(open,auxiliary_feedwater_a_block_valve,499).
attempted(open,auxiliary_feedwater_b_block_valve,500).
attempted(turn_off,primary_pump_a,4402).
attempted(turn_off,primary_pump_b,6036).
attempted(close,pressurizer_block_valve,8521).
The raw data are all the variables and actions recorded at all times, from t0 = 0, to tend =
8521. To mimic the data streaming in the NPP system, variables, and actions at each timestep,
t, are extracted, using Python, from the raw data file and passed to the ASP4OSS system via
files. ASP4OSS processes data within a window of 1 minute, i.e., at the time t ≥ 60, ASP4OSS
considers the data in the range [t −59,t].
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Recommended Action Recommended Action
rec(open,auxiliary feedwater a block valve,2). rec(open,auxiliary feedwater b block valve,2).
........................................ ........................................
rec(close,pressurizer backup block valve,16). rec(close,pressurizer power operated relief valve,16).
rec(open,auxiliary feedwater a block valve,16). rec(open,auxiliary feedwater b block valve,16).
........................................ ........................................
rec(close,pressurizer backup block valve,118). rec(close,pressurizer power operated relief valve,118).
rec(open,auxiliary feedwater a block valve,118). rec(open,auxiliary feedwater b block valve,118).
rec(turn on,high pressure injection pump,118). ........................................
rec(close,pressurizer backup block valve,8521). rec(close,pressurizer power operated relief valve,8521).
rec(turn on,high pressure injection pump,8521).
Fig. 4: Output: Recommendations (rec stands for recommendation, x stands for the time step x )
Inferred non-observed variables Inferred non-observed variables
closed(auxiliary feedwater a block valve,2). closed(auxiliary feedwater b block valve,2).
lack of water supply(secondary loop A,2). lack of water supply(secondary loop B,2).
closed(auxiliary feedwater a block valve,18). closed(auxiliary feedwater b block valve,18).
lack of water supply(secondary loop A,18). lack of water supply(secondary loop B,18).
stuck open(pporv,18). ........................................
closed(auxiliary feedwater a block valve,847). closed(auxiliary feedwater b block valve,847).
lack of water supply(secondary loop A,847). lack of water supply(secondary loop B,847).
steam(primary loop A,847). stuck open(pporv,847).
........................................ stuck open(pporv,8521).
Fig. 5: Output: non-observed variables (pporv: pressurizer power operated relief valve)
For each minute, ASP4OSS outputs the computed answer sets, which contain recommen-
dations (e.g., turn on an auxiliary pump), values of inferred variables (e.g., leakage), and the
inferred actions (e.g., condensate pump A is tripped). Figure 4 illustrates some of the recom-
mendations that the ASP system suggests at specific timesteps. For instance, at the beginning of
the scenario, the auxiliary feedwater pumps were started. Therefore, a recommendation to open
the closed auxiliary feedwater line block valve, at t = 2, is suggested. Otherwise, the feedwater
will be blocked. Because the emergency feedwater line block valve was opened at t = 499, this
recommendation is no longer proposed in the next timesteps.
Some of the inferred non-observed variables are listed in Figure 5 at specific timesteps. For
instance, the lack of water supply (leakage) was inferred at t = 2 because of the low steam gener-
ator water level. The inferred actions may be similar or different from the attempted actions. The
occurrences of these actions are verified by detecting the action effect and watching the observed
variables. Figure 6 lists all the inferred actions at each time step.
We observe that this module of ASP4OSS would have provided useful assistance to the oper-
ator in the decision making process for the following reasons:
1. The operators did not notice that the primary loop water reached saturation pressure (water
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Time Inferred Actions
1 ith(trip,condensate pump a,1). 1 ith(trip,condensate pump b,1).
2 ith(trip,feedwater pump a,2). 2 ith(trip,feedwater pump b,2).
2 ith(trip,turbine1,2). 2 ith(start,auxiliary feedwater pump a,2).
2 ith(start,auxiliary feedwater pump b,2). 11 ith(trip,reactor1,11).
122 ith(start,high pressure injection pump,122). 278 ith(trip,high pressure injection pump,278).
4403 ith(trip,primary pump a,4403). 6037 ith(trip,primary pump b,6037).
Fig. 6: Output: inferred actions (ith stands for it happened)
Diagnosis Module ExplanationModule
requests
(answer set)
explanation
graph
Fig. 7: Communication Between Diagnosis and Explanation Modules
converted to steam causing inadequate reactor cooling). The existence of steam is inferred
by ASP4OSS (see Figure 5, at t = 847).
2. Because of the reasoning system capacity to monitor more variables simultaneously, the
reasoning system gives early recommendations for closing the pressurizer block valve (see
Figure 4 at t = 16) and opening the emergency feedwater line block valves (see Figure 4 at
t = 2). In reality, these decisions have been delayed because the pressurizer block valve was
closed at t = 8521, and the emergency feedwater line block valves were opened at t = 499
(see Table 1).
3. ASP4OSS could distinguish between the executed action, it happened/3 in Figure 6, and
the attempted actions, attempted/3, by watching the action effect. This feature is signifi-
cant for the TMI-2 scenario because of the confusion about the PORV. An action to close
the PORV was attempted at t = 11 (see the attempted actions in Section 4.1), but the valve
was not closed (see the executed actions in Figure 6), and the primary loop pressure kept
decreasing.
4.2 Generating Explanations
We implemented an explanation module for generating explanations for the answers computed
by the diagnosis module. In this experiment, these two modules run in parallel as two cooper-
ating processes (written in Python) and interact with each other via messages (Figure 7). The
explanation module has two threads, one for receiving requests from the diagnosis module and
one for returning the explanation graphs. Whenever a request from the diagnosis module arrives,
the receiving thread puts it into a queue. Once the explanation module recognizes that a request
arrived (the queue is not empty), it computes the explanation graphs (for atoms indicating the
recommended actions and the inferred variables/actions) and displays them. We note that the
focus is on these atoms because they are the most significant atoms in the answer sets, reflecting
the activities within the nuclear reactor. This can be relaxed by allowing the diagnosis module to
indicate the atoms of interest in the request.
The explanation module computes and draws the explanation graph as defined in Subsec-
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Fig. 8: Left: Explanation of it happened(trip,condensate pump a,1). Right: Explanation of
steam(primary loop A,901)
tion 2.3 for atoms occurring in ASP4OSS. The explanation module provides all possible expla-
nation graphs for the chosen atoms (e.g. recommendation/3 in Figure 9 and Figure 10) to support
the decision making for the operators4.
We use solid, dash and dot lines to represent +, − and ○ links, respectively. In all graphs, we
also omit all links to ⊺ from nodes with dash boxes. Some examples are listed below:● Figure 8 (left) shows that the condensate pump A is tripped at t = 1 because its pump flow at
t = 0 is 100, and it sharply decreases to 0 at t = 1.● Figure 8 (right) indicates the formation of steam in the primary loop A, at t = 901 because the
pressure of the primary loop A (1213 PSI) is less than the saturation pressure corresponding
to the inlet temperature of the primary loop A (1258 PSI).● The auxiliary feedwater line block valve (loop A) opened at t = 1201 has two possible expla-
nations which are presented in Figure 9 and Figure 10. The recommendation is to open the
auxiliary feedwater line block valve because the valve is closed, and there are no attempted
actions to open that block valve. The valve is closed because a lack of water supply, in the
secondary loop, at t = 1201 is detected. Lack of water supply is inferred, in the secondary
loop, because the condensate pump in that secondary loop is tripped at t = 1 (Figure 9) or the
feedwater pump in that secondary loop is tripped at t = 2 (Figure 10), and the corresponding
steam generator water level (20 cm) is below a minimum value (30 cm by default).
4.3 Performance
In this work, the computational expense of the overall ASP-based reasoning system, accounting
for 16 variables and eight actions within 8521 seconds (142 minutes) of the accident scenario, is
30 minutes (on a four-processor machine). It was assumed that the values of all variables were
updated each second, and new outputs are computed each second. Depending on the variables’
time scales, answers can be generated at a slower rate to decrease the ASP computational time.
We found that the computation of the explanation module would not be a bottleneck of the overall
system because it takes at most 5 seconds to compute the first batch of the explanation graphs.
We use clingo as the off-the-shelf tool in this development. Because of clingo simplified rules
4 Observes that explanation graphs (or justifications) could be compared with each other (e.g., via a preference relation).
As such, we could allow operators to specify their preferences and the system returns the set of preferred explanation
graphs . Dealing with preferences of this type can be done straightforwardly in ASP. However, anecdotal stories related
to TMI-2 suggest that being able to present all possible explanations is important. Indeed, no one would ever think
of the possibility that the valve, PORV, was stuck open. Preferences are often given to components deemed more
“important” than a valve. It was said that if someone has noticed this problem on time and closed the block valve,
the accident would not have happened. Indeed, this is one of the actions recommended by the system very early on
(see the recommended action at time = 16, Figure 4). For this reason, our focus in this paper was on generating all
explanations.
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Fig. 9: The first explanation of recommendation(open,auxiliary f eedwater a block valve,1201)
Fig. 10: The second explanation of recommendation(open,auxiliary f eedwater a block valve,1201)
and false atoms (e.g., atoms which do not occur in the head of any rules are removed from the
program), the explanation graphs are computed using the simplified programs from clingo. As
such, some theoretical graphs/links for certain atoms might not be returned from the explanation
module.
Practically, implementing an AI-guided decision support system still faces some challenges
as many NPPs rely on traditional analog technology. Also, relying on AI may exacerbate the
concerns about NPP cybersecurity. Nevertheless, the explainability of the ASP reasoning system
outputs gives ASP an advantage over other methods (e.g., machine learning methods).
5 Conclusions
We discussed an application of ASP in analyzing the most severe nuclear accident in US history,
the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) accident scenario, focusing on the ability of reasoning
about an event history to identify diagnoses and generating explanations of ASP. The experiment
shows that the ASP-based system can assist NPP operators in several ways:
1. Augmented capabilities: It provides operators with the capability to reason with several
variables and monitor many dynamic events at the same time. In the TMI-2 scenario, the
operator was overwhelmed by many alarms and monitoring many dynamic events. In our
experiment, the system needs only around 30 minutes to process the information of the
first 142 minutes of the scenario, identifying actions that should have been executed much
earlier than the operators (see Subsection 4.1).
2. Explanation: It provides explanations for the recommendations or information related to
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the event history (e.g., inferred values or inferred actions) that the operators would not
have been able to observe.
This work shows that ASP, and more generally, declarative programming can be employed in
supporting the control of complex and critical systems.
In the near future, we would like to integrate the modules proposed in this paper with the
reasoning system in (Hanna et al. 2019) to provide a platform for supporting NPP operators
which can take into consideration the uncertainty associated with actions and observations (e.g.,
sensor values) as well as, potentially, users’ preference and knowledge in planning and selecting
a smaller set of explanations.
While we focus on generating all explanations in this paper, it might be useful to provide the
users with choices (e.g., use vs. not use preference ). Last but not least, we would like to identify
the opportunity to work with NPP operators, by providing the system as a “passive supporter,”
which monitors the environment and provides users with explanations whenever it is asked to do
so.
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